


THE BATTLEFIELD and OLD HOMES tours
are open Saturday, December 12 and
Sunday, December 13, 1964
Saturday 9:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.
Sunday 1:00 P.M. to 4:00 P.M.
See inclosed map



RELICS DISPLAY

Saturday, Dec. 12 and Sunday, Dec. 13, 1964

THE PARTHENON

Centennial Park

West End Ave. at Twenty Fourth Ave.

Saturday 9:00 A.M. to 4:45 P.M.

Sunday 1:00 P.M. to 4:45 P.M.


M. Hume Parks Director of Relics Display


This collection of firearms, edged weapons, ammunition and accouterments has been brought together from far and wide so that the collector and the casual visitor may both have the opportunity to view the items handled by the participants in the Battle of Nashville, 100 years ago.

In addition to the weapons of war, household articles, letters, diaries and books are attractively displayed.

Maps, reproductions of uniforms and clothing, and miniature cannon, soldiers and horses have been prepared by the school children of the area for your information and enjoyment.

ADMISSION FREE





PARADE

Centennial Park

10:00 A.M. Saturday, Dec. 12, 1964

Parade Marshal—Maj. Gen. Van D. Nunnally

(The Adjutant General of Tennessee)

Assistant Parade Marshal—Lt. Col. Harrell E. Webb

(Tennessee Army National Guard)

Protocol Officer, Reviewing Stand—





Col. Campbell Brown, U.S.A. (Ret.)

ORDER OF MARCH

- 1. Escort**
- 2. Parade Marshal & Governor**
- 3. Chairman of Davidson County Civil War Centennial Committee and Mayor**
- 4. Chairman Steering Committee, Battle of Nashville**
- 5. Members of Steering Committee, County Centennial Committee and State Centennial Commission**
- 6. President General United Daughters of Confederacy**
- 7. National Commander Sons of Confederate Veterans**
- 8. Descendants of Soldiers who fought in Battle of Nashville**
- 9. Modern Military Band**
- 10. Massed Colors**
- 11. Modern Military Units**
- 12. Band**
- 13. Massed Colors of Reactivated Union Units**
- 14. Reactivated Union Units**
- 15. Band**
- 16. Massed Colors of Reactivated Confederate Units**
- 17. Reactivated Confederate Units**
- 18. Band**
- 19. Reactivated Union Cavalry**
- 20. Reactivated Confederate Cavalry**
- 21. Union Artillery**
- 22. Confederate Artillery**



re-enactment



OF THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

Coordinated and Directed by

Hal R. Swann, Jr.

Steeplechase Area

Percy Warner Park on Old Hickory Boulevard

2:00 P.M. to 3:30 P.M.

Saturday, December 12, 1964

First Phase

The Confederate Army under General John B. Hood moved by way of the Franklin, Granny White and Hillsboro Pikes with J. R. Chalmers' Cavalry on the extreme west with A. P. Stewart's Corps next, then S. D. Lee's Corps and with B. F. Cheatham's Corps on the extreme east at Rains' Hill. The Confederates held this position from early December until the battle opened on December 15, 1864. Opposing the gray army was the Union Army under General George H. Thomas which was in line from west to east in the following order: J. H. Wilson, J. M. Schofield, A. J. Smith, T. J. Wood and J. B. Steedman.

Second Phase

On December 15, the Battle opened with skirmishing and artillery preparation as Wilson's Cavalry spearheaded a grand wheel of the Federal forces against the Confederate left with Chalmers and Stewart receiving the brunt of the assault. Late in the afternoon, Cheatham was pulled from the right and placed between Stewart and Chalmers.

Third Phase

The night of December 15, Hood dug in from Peach Orchard Hill on the east to Shy's Hill on the west. The Federal Army took positions opposing this defense and in the morning prepared for the attack by constant pressure all along the line supported by continuous artillery fire.

Fourth Phase

At mid-afternoon, the Federal left moved forward in an assault on the Confederate right at Peach Orchard Hill which was repulsed. Later, the Federal right attacked Shy's Hill and were successful in breaking the line at the angle. This caused the collapse of the Confederate left and center and forced the withdrawal of Lee's troops from Peach Orchard Hill on the Confederate right.

As night came on, Hood gathered his shattered forces and restored some order at Brentwood. On December 17, 1864, the remnants of the army, under constant Federal harrassment, retreated toward the Tennessee River.

re-enactment

OF THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

Coordinated and Directed by





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Memorial Service for Union Dead

NATIONAL CEMETERY

Gallatin Road

4:00 P.M. Sunday, December 13, 1964

Sponsored by Nashville Post 5 of the American Legion.

Committee: John E. Bosworth, Chairman, Sydney A. Groom, Ike F. Gentry, Jr.

- 1. Services called to order by Chairman of Memorial Committee; John E. Bosworth**
- 2. Advancement of Colors: Color Guard of Post 5, American Legion**
- 3. National Anthem: Post 5 American Legion Band**
- 4. Invocation: Rev. Pickens Johnson, Associate Pastor, McKendree Methodist Church**
- 5. Introduction of Memorial Speaker**
- 6. Memorial Address: Hon. Joe C. Carr, Secretary of State, Tennessee**
- 7. Salute to the dead: Reactivated Memorial Units**
- 8. Taps**
- 9. Benediction: Rev. Pickens Johnson**
- 10. Retreat of Colors**



SHY'S HILL

Memorial Service

Benton Smith Road


4:00 P.M. December 16, 1964


**Sponsored by the Confederate Historical Society of Nashville.
Franklyn McCord, President.**

- 1. Invocation: Buford Gotto**
- 2. Introduction of speaker: Franklyn McCord**
- 3. Memorial address by Hugh Walker**
- 4. Echo Guns**
- 5. Echo Taps**
- 6. Furl the Confederate colors**

A Portfolio of Photographs

Nashville in 1864





The photographs in this portfolio are from the collection of Lanier Merritt of Nashville.

ON THE PRECEDING page is a view of Nashville looking north from the roof of the Literary Department, University of Nashville. On the river may be seen a pontoon bridge and beyond it, the foundation of a destroyed bridge and, still farther in the distance, a railroad bridge.

★ ★ ★


AT LEFT is the George Cunningham home on High Street (now 6th Avenue), which was used by General George H. Thomas and several Federal commanders before him as their headquarters.


★ ★ ★

IMMEDIATELY BELOW is a military spur of the Louisville & Nashville railroad tracks in northwest Nashville.

★ ★ ★

AT THE BOTTOM of this page is the Louisville & Nashville depot on Church Street.





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
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
★ ★ ★

AT THE BOTTOM of this page is the Louisville & Nashville depot on Church Street.





ABOVE IS another view of Nashville from the roof of the Literary Department building looking to the west. In the foreground is Market Street (now 2d Avenue) and in the left background, Fort Morton. Below is the Davidson County Court House as it appeared during the war. It was designed by the famous architect, William Strickland of Philadelphia. Note the broken window panes. Beyond to the right is the old City Hotel, a landmark in wartime Nashville.



... The Battle of Nashville: Fighting Gets Hotter

Continued from Page 11

Wood, of course, had no idea how strongly Montgomery Hill was defended. He did know, however, that it barred the further advance of his men in this sector and would have to be reduced. So, after ordering a thorough pounding of the position by artillery, Colonel Sidney Post of Beatty's division was ordered to lead his brigade in an assault on this position. They swept up the wooded slope, over the enemy's intrenchments, and the hill was won.

MEANWHILE, Schofield's corps had remained idle just outside the works where it had moved at daylight. General Darius N. Couch's division had formed in the rear of General Smith's left near the Harding Pike, and while Smith was maneuvering into an advanced position during the morning, Couch moved forward behind his left, within supporting distance. The division commanded by General Jacob D. Cox had remained practically stationary to the left of Couch.

Couch was an 1846 West Point graduate, and had served as a corps commander and second in command to General Hooker at Chancellorsville in May 1863. After that battle Couch, refusing to serve further under Hooker, had been given a noncombat assignment. Then in December 1864, he volunteered to serve as a division commander under Thomas, and was assigned to Schofield's corps. Cox was an Ohio lawyer and politician, without prewar military training or experience, but was regarded as able. In active command of the battle line at Franklin, he conducted that operation efficiently. Couch was 42 and Cox, 36.

As Smith's corps advanced, with Hatch's and Croxton's divisions of Wilson's cavalry on his right, his advance drove the Confederate skirmishers before them like a covey of quail. Smith's forward movement bore more to the left than Thomas had expected, so about 1 p.m., Schofield was ordered to swing his corps far around the rear of the advancing line and form on Smith's right, thus allowing the cavalry to operate still more widely and effectively against the extreme Confederate left with its isolated and lightly manned redoubts.

Early in the afternoon, the advancing Federal infantry, cavalry, and dismounted cavalry confronted and overlapped the Confederate line along the Hillsboro Pike. The zero hour had come.

AS THE BLUE JUGGERNAUT rolled across the fields between the Harding and Hillsboro Pikes, General Hood had not been idle. When he saw that he was confronted with the overtures to a full-scale assault on his lines, he moved up his headquarters from Travelers' Rest on the Franklin Pike to Lealand, the home of Judge John M. Lea, just east of the Granny White Pike. Here he began to do everything he could—which was not much—to meet the formidable assault he could see rolling up on Stewart in his weakly defended left wing.

General Alexander Peter Stewart was a native Tennessean, born in 1821, who had graduated from West Point in 1845, but served only three years in the Army. He was given a brigadier general's commission in the Confederate Army in 1861, and had served in the Army of Tennessee since then. He was promoted to major general in 1863, and when General Leonidas Polk was killed in June 1864, was given command of Polk's corps, with the temporary rank of lieutenant general. His men called him "Old Straight."

Stewart, that misty morning of December 15, soon perceived that his position was the immediate objective of the Federal attack, and he began promptly to make the best possible disposition of his inadequate manpower. When he had moved back on December 10 from the Montgomery Hill line to the solid works he now held, based on his main salient at Redoubt No. 1, General Walthall's division was not placed in the line but was put in bivouac, protecting the extreme left of the Confederate infantry line. Walthall was Hood's youngest division commander, only 33 years old, but he was a dogged fighter of great ability. His division had suffered severely at Franklin, one of

his brigades having 432 casualties out of the 1,100 who went into battle. When General Samuel G. French, in failing health, left Hood's army before Nashville, his two brigades (Ector's and Sears's) were assigned to Walthall. Ector had been sent to the relief of Chalmers on the far left, and Sears was placed in the main line, to the left of Loring, holding the salient embracing Redoubts No. 1 and No. 2 to the east of the Hillsboro Pike.

AS SOON as Stewart learned that the Federals were advancing in full strength west of the Hillsboro Pike, he ordered Walthall to prepare for action. Walthall placed a company of infantry and a battery of artillery in each of the redoubts in his immediate front (No. 4 and No. 5), although they were still incomplete. The remainder of his command was put in position behind a stone wall along the eastern side of the pike, extending for the distance between Redoubts No. 3 and No. 4. Ector's retreating brigade reached the Confederate main line in the early afternoon, and Walthall placed it on his left. Even with this extension, however, Stewart's line on his extreme left flank was still not long enough to cover Redoubt No. 5, and he was expressing it mildly when he said in his report, "My line was stretched to its utmost tension."

Stewart appealed to Hood for reinforcements. In response, Hood about noon ordered General Edward Johnson, commanding the left division of Lee's corps, to send Manigault's and Deas's brigades to Stewart's immediate assistance, later sending also the other two brigades of the division, Sharp's and Brantley's—a shift that could be safely made, as Lee's corps was experiencing hardly more than a token attack. Hood also ordered two of Cheatham's divisions on the extreme right to support Stewart, and they started promptly on the march of nearly three miles across country.

THE first collision of the enveloping Federals and the defending Confederates came when Colonel Datus E. Coon, with his hard-riding brigade of Hatch's cavalry division, swinging around the right of McArthur's infantry division, found himself on the exposed flank of Redoubt No. 5, the detached and unsupported outermost outpost of the Confederate left. Coon's men quickly dismounted and with their deadly Spencer repeating rifles moved to the attack. They were supported by the first brigade of McArthur's division and a battery of artillery which immediately opened on the Confederate position. The Confederate guns replied, and there was an artillery duel for about an hour, during which Coon's dismounted troopers and McArthur's infantrymen edged closer to the Confederate works. When they eventually got close enough to charge the redoubt they were met with a burst of canister from the four Napoleon guns on the hill, accompanied by as heavy a musketry fire as a hundred defenders with their single-shot muskets could develop. The result, however, was never in doubt. The fast-shooting Federals swarmed up the hill, over the breastworks and through the embrasures, and literally overpowered the defending force, capturing the guns and practically all the men in the redoubt. As was not unusual during the war, there was some dispute among the victors as to who got there first. Smith said in his report that Coon's men scaled the fortifications "simultaneously with our skirmishers"; but the cavalymen denied this, saying that the infantry did not get there until after they had the situation well in hand.

Whoever got there first, the Federals had hardly reached the inside of the captured works when they received a salvo from the guns in Redoubt No. 4, and they then turned their attention to this Confederate strong point, which was being invested by the rest of Hatch's and McArthur's divisions.

REDOUBT NO. 4 proved to be not quite so easy a nut to crack as No. 5, although held by no larger a force. It also had a battery of four smoothbore Napoleon guns, manned by 48 men under Captain Charles L. Lumsden, supported by 100 infantry in shallow breastworks stretching a short distance on both sides of the redoubt. Lumsden, a graduate of Virginia Military Insti-

tute and, when the war started, commandant of cadets at the University of Alabama, had been ordered to hold the position "at all hazards," and he took his orders literally. Hammered by three batteries of rifled guns from a ridge 600 yards to the west, and almost encompassed by 12 regiments of infantry and two brigades of dismounted cavalry, the Confederate defenders by some miracle of valor clung to their beleaguered position for three hours, banging away with their smoothbores as fast as they could be served. Not until the swarming Federals were actually within the works did Captain Lumsden give the "Take care of yourselves, boys" order, as he and the surviving defenders made off for Walthall's rock wall along the pike.

Meanwhile Schofield had swung his corps around as ordered and was forming on Smith's right, thus making it possible for Wilson to remount his men and move out on a wider arc across the Hillsboro Pike to the left and rear of Walthall's infantry line, commanding both the Hillsboro and Granny White Pikes. Chalmers was still miles away on the Charlotte Pike, pinned down by Johnson's cavalry division, so Wilson was unopposed as he placed his force in position to take a decisive part in the action the next day, although he took no further active part in the fighting on December 15.

WITH the two defending redoubts in his front lost, Walthall's line was now subjected to a blistering bombardment of heavy shellfire from Smith's big guns. Lacking artillery, Walthall was unable to reply; but there was no immediate effort to charge Walthall's thin line as Smith regrouped his divisions on the western side of the pike. During this breathing spell, Walthall tried to strengthen his precarious position by moving Ector's brigade "down near Compton's house" to hold the pike for the protection of the left flank. But after Redoubt No. 5 had fallen and the victorious Federals came streaming down across the pike, Ector's men were driven back to the east and a spearhead of advancing Federals drove in between them and Cantey's brigade, thus isolating Ector's brigade from the ensuing action of Walthall's division.

The Federals driving across the pike into the woods near the Compton house placed a battery on the high hill southwest of the house. Walthall attempted to meet this threat by detaching Reynolds and his brigade from the right of his line to his left, and Reynolds had some temporary success in stemming the Blue tide. But soon the Federals had occupied also the hill west of the Compton house and, shelling Reynolds with the guns on both hills, and threatening both flanks of his brigade with their advancing infantry, drove him back through the woods toward the Granny White Pike.

The reinforcing brigades of Deas and Manigault had meanwhile arrived on the left flank, and were placed in support of Walthall. They were of little or no help. Walthall, to save his men from capture, went into precipitate retreat and the flanking Federals swept northward east of the pike.

Stewart, witnessing the impending debacle on his left, hastily withdrew a battery from his not yet hard-pressed salient at Redoubt No. 1 and placed it on a hill east of the pike where it could sweep the flanking Federals. He ordered the brigades of Deas and Manigault to rally to its support; but says in his report, "they again fled, however, abandoning the battery, which was captured. . . . The other brigades of Johnson's division had come up, but were unable to check the progress of the enemy, who had passed the Hillsboro Pike a full half-mile, completely turning our flank and gaining the rear of both Walthall and Loring, whose situation was becoming perilous in the extreme." Seeing that his position was untenable, Stewart immediately ordered both Walthall and Loring to withdraw, an order which Walthall's men had already anticipated. Loring promptly evacuated his men from the line, leaving Redoubts No. 1 and No. 2 unoccupied and undefended.

MEANWHILE, the third brigade of McArthur's division had been coming up in front of that portion of Stewart's line defended by Redoubt No. 3, west of the pike. As the brigade approached the Confederate position, it came under direct and vigorous artillery fire, which inflicted considerable damage but did not slow the advance. When the men got within striking distance of Redoubt No. 3 they were ordered to storm it, and

thus they reduced the last pocket of resistance on the Confederate line of defense.

McArthur's men, having captured Redoubt No. 3, turned their attention to No. 2 and No. 1, the guns of which had been playing on them as they advanced on No. 3. They were unaware that during the afternoon General Wood had been cautiously approaching Redoubt No. 1. Wood recognized it as the key to the Confederate position, but realized that it would be difficult to carry by frontal attack. He therefore attempted to prepare for a successful infantry attack by a prolonged bombardment of the position by two batteries of his artillery, which almost demolished the Confederate works. He still experienced difficulty in getting his infantry to charge the position; but about 4:30 p.m., Kimball's division did move to the attack and, as Wood says in his report, "rushed forward up the steep ascent and over the intrenchments." Kimball's and McArthur's men each claimed they reached the top first. Neither Wood nor Smith mentions that whichever attacking force had that distinction, it was somewhat of an empty honor, as Loring's defending force was already in retreat, having been ordered by Stewart to withdraw and form along the Granny White Pike.


WHEN the early December nightfall ended the day's action, the elements of the two contending armies were scattered in bewildering confusion. Thomas' units had to a great extent lost their cohesion. On his left Steedman's men were still holding on to the position they had taken early in the day, apparently unaware that Cheatham's forces had been withdrawing from their front all afternoon. Wood, after sweeping over Stewart's salient, had been ordered by Thomas to move east toward the Franklin Pike, reach it if possible before dark, and form his troops across it facing south. Darkness, however, caused Wood to halt his corps shortly after crossing the Granny White Pike to wait until morning. Smith, after driving the Confederate left wing out of its position, had halted for the night in a line between the Hillsboro and Granny White Pikes, and roughly parallel with them. Schofield, on the right, was east of the Hillsboro Pike, with Couch's division entrenched across the hill he had occupied late in the afternoon; and Cox's division, on Couch's right, was roughly perpendicular to him, facing east. Wilson's cavalry divisions were bivouacked on the extreme right, from the Hillsboro to the Granny White Pikes, where they had taken a strong position on the ridge where the road passes through a gap just beyond the old site of Granny White's tavern.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES were also disorganized and scattered. Cheatham's divisions at nightfall, in the process of being moved to the left, were widely scattered. Bate was already in position on the left, though he arrived too late to take part in the action. Cleburne's division, now under J. A. Smith, was on its way to the left, but bivouacked on the Granny White Pike near Lealand when stopped by darkness. Lowrey's brigade was just starting from its original position on the right. Lee, with the two remaining divisions of his corps, was still firmly holding in the Confederate center, though stretched out in a pitifully thin line. Stewart's battered corps had retired to a position roughly parallel to the Granny White Pike, east of that road, with his left near the Bradford house on the pike. Ector's brigade clung to its precarious resting place on the hill (later called Shy's Hill) where General Hood himself had personally placed it when he encountered its members falling back late in the afternoon.

AT THE CLOSE of the fighting Thomas returned to his headquarters in the city and telegraphed Halleck to tell him of the day's success. "I shall attack the enemy again tomorrow, if he stands to fight," said Thomas in closing his message, "and if he retreats during the night will pursue him." Halleck sent him a gracious acknowledgment; Grant, as soon as he heard the news, sent a telegram saying that "I was just on my way to Nashville, but I shall go no farther"; and then went on to urge Thomas to give the enemy no rest "until he is entirely destroyed." President Lincoln the next morning telegraphed "the nation's thanks"; and, taking his cue from Grant, added: "You

made a magnificent beginning. A grand consummation is within your easy reach. Do not let it slip."

Possibly the destruction of Hood's army might have seemed "easy" to President Lincoln and to General Grant; but Thomas, on the ground, knew Hood for the determined, tenacious fighter he was, and knew that there was still work to do "if he stands to fight."




HOOD, true to his reputation, did stand to fight; but it taxed his military skill and resourcefulness to improvise an adequate defensive line in the face of a victorious enemy. Working throughout the night and the morning of the 16th, however, he and his engineers did patch together a continuous line in which to meet the expected Federal pursuit. Lee's corps, which had engaged in the least actual combat the preceding day, was moved back on the Franklin Pike to high ground about two miles to the rear. Here Hood established the new right wing of the Confederate army, with hastily scratched-out breastworks and gun emplacements on Peach Orchard Hill just east of the Franklin Pike, and his line extending westward across the pike. Stewart was moved back to a position with his left crossing the Granny White Pike, the main part of his force behind a rock wall, behind which a shallow trench was dug, and his right joining with Lee's left. Cheatham's men were to the left of Stewart, constituting the Confederate left. Shy's Hill, inexpertly fortified during the night, was the salient on this flank, with the rifle pits turning sharply southward to a refused position on the next high hills. The distance from Shy's Hill to Peach Orchard Hill is about two and a half miles as the crow flies, but the meandering Confederate line was about a mile longer. The new line was established about midnight, and the men worked the rest of the night feverishly digging out the best defenses possible.

IN HIS OFFICIAL REPORT, General Thomas, after summarizing the events of December 15, states simply: "The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow." Thomas does not say, however, just what those preparations were. The net result, however, was that when the Federal forces got into alignment on the morning of the 16th, they had established a continuous line overlapping both Confederate flanks. Schofield was on the right in the position he had taken late in the previous afternoon; to his left was Smith, whose right was opposite the slope of Shy's Hill with his left between the Granny White and Franklin Pikes where it joined the right of Wood, who faced south across the Franklin Pike confronting Lee's position on the Confederate right. Steedman, on the morning of the 16th, after leaving a brigade in his rear to guard the Murfreesboro and Nolensville Pikes, pushed on out the Nolensville Road, eventually taking a position between the pike and the left of Wood's corps. Here he stood until early in the afternoon, when he was instructed by General Thomas to form a junction with the troops of Wood's command and prepare to assault the Confederate right flank.

THE MORNING of the 16th was featured by an exceptionally heavy and continuous bombardment of the whole Confederate line by the superior Federal artillery, particularly severe at Shy's Hill on their left and Peach Orchard Hill on their right. Shy's Hill was subjected to a continuous all-day crossfire from three directions. To reply to this bombardment Bate had only three batteries of smoothbore guns. Lee on the right wing also suffered throughout the day from the guns of Wood's and Steedman's corps, which kept up fire of such intensity that it was considered worthy of special mention in both Federal and Confederate reports.

During the morning and early afternoon the Federals made several feeler attacks on Lee's stronghold on Peach Orchard Hill, but none was successful. Clayton, describing one of these assaults



HOOD'S HEADQUARTERS before Nashville were in the John Overton house shown in this drawing from "Century" magazine.

on his division by Steedman's colored troops, says that the attackers "suffered great slaughter. . . . It was with difficulty that the enthusiasm of the troops could be repressed so as to keep them from going over the works in pursuit of the enemy. Five color bearers with their colors were shot down within a few steps of the works." Holtzclaw reports a "desperate charge" on his line at 10 a.m. and a "determined charge" at noon, both of which were repulsed. Of the losses suffered by the attacking Federals in their second charge, Holtzclaw says:

I have seen most of the battlefields of the west, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two right regiments, the great masses and disorder of the enemy enabling the left to rake them in flank, while the right, with a coolness unexampled, scarcely threw away a shot at their front. The enemy at last broke and fled in wild disorder.

Shortly before noon General Thomas in person joined Wood on the Franklin Pike, approved the disposition of his troops, and told him that he wished Wood and Steedman to cooperate in an effort to carry the Confederate works on Peach Orchard Hill. After conferring with Steedman and looking over the ground, Wood concluded that this could be done, in spite of the strength of the position. After careful preparation the assault, led by Post's brigade, was launched at about 3 p.m. The ardor of the attacking force was not dampened by a cold rain that had begun to fall about noon, and they moved forward with "a cloud of skirmishers" in front to draw the fire of the defending line and annoy its artillerymen. Nevertheless the attack was repulsed and heavy casualties inflicted. Post was badly wounded and his brigade hurled back.

WHILE THIS ATTACK on the Confederate right was being repulsed, however, things were not going so well on Hood's left. Wilson's hard-driving cavalry brigades had gained the rear of the Confederate left and, fighting dismounted, were putting strong pressure on the defensive line which had been bent back into a fishhook extension of the left wing. Even without this pressure from the rear, the Confederate left was none too strong. Shy's Hill was a formidable looking elevation, but when General Thomas Benton Smith's brigade of Bate's division stretched out to fill the place vacated by Ector's brigade when that unit was withdrawn to be placed in reserve, it was discovered that the works established by Ector's men during the night were improperly located. By some engineering blunder, in the darkness and confusion of the preceding evening, the works were placed so far back from the actual brow of the hill as to give the defending force a limited view and range on the front. This fatal weakness was accentuated by the curvature of the hill and the falling away of the entrenched lines from the angle, making it impossible for the defenders to protect the front of the angle by flanking fire. Also, to make a bad matter worse, there was no abatis or other obstruction to impede the approach of an assaulting party. To add to his discomfiture, Bate was told by Cheatham that it would be necessary for him to stretch his thin line still farther to the left to occupy the position vacated by

troops that had been withdrawn to protect the extreme left then in process of being turned by Wilson.

WILSON, who had quickly recognized the value of the position he occupied in rear of Hood's raveled-out left wing, set about capitalizing his advantage. Extending eastward from Schofield's right, Wilson's dismounted skirmishers presented a battle-line a mile and a half long, advancing diagonally across the Granny White Pike, inclining towards Nashville and completely in rear of Hood's left. By noon Wilson's 4,000 troopers (almost as many as Cheatham had left in his whole corps) had pressed their way slowly up the wooded hills in a curving line until they were facing Nashville, parallel with (and in rear of) Hood's main line. Here they were looking down on the backs of Bate's and Walthall's men—a lethal weapon aimed directly at Hood's point of greatest weakness.

Punished by the continuing artillery fire, faced in front and flank by two corps of infantry, and seeing the flanking cavalrymen pouring over the hills in their rear, Cheatham's men were in a desperate plight. The jaws of the Federal vise were closing relentlessly on them. In the words of one of the luckless privates caught in this trap: "The Yankee bullets and shells were coming from all directions, passing one another in the air."

Hood's left wing was doomed. After the battle there were rival Federal claims as to just which unit sparked the advance that closed the jaws of the nutcracker on Shy's Hill. Apparently, however, the movement of Smith's men from the south and Schofield's from the flank occurred simultaneously. Bate's report sums up the climactic action:

About 4 p.m. the enemy with heavy force assaulted the line near the angle, and carried it at that point where Ector's brigade had built the light works; not, however, until the gallant and obstinate Colonel Shy and nearly half of his brave men had fallen, together with the largest part of the three right companies of the 37th Georgia, which regiment constituted my extreme left. When the breach was made, this command—the consolidated fragments of the 2d, 10th, 15th, 20th, 30th and 37th Tennessee Regiments—still contested the ground under Major Lucas; and finally, when overwhelming numbers pressed them back, only 65 of the command escaped. . . . The command was nearly annihilated.

Some of Bate's men did flee to safety, but most of the others who were not killed or wounded stayed resolutely in the line and continued firing until surrounded and captured. Among those taken on the hill were General Thomas Benton Smith and Major Jacob A. Lash, commander of Finley's brigade. General H. R. Jackson, commanding Bate's other brigade, was made a prisoner as he attempted to make his way back from the front line to where his horse had been left.

AS THE ROUTED FORCES of Cheatham's corps fled in disorder through the fields and over the hills in their rear toward the Franklin Pike, the contagion of defeat spread rapidly down the Confederate line—and the equally contagious exhilaration of victory flashed eastward along the Federal works. The triumphant Federals sweeping eastward from their conquest of Shy's Hill swooped down on Stewart's exposed left flank so swiftly and unexpectedly that he had no time to improvise a defense. In the words of one of the officers in French's division:

Realizing their almost hopeless situation, they abandoned their line and organizations and retreated in the wildest disorder and confusion. Many remained in the line and surrendered. In a few minutes the organizations of the corps on the left and center of the army had wholly disappeared, and the routed army rushed over the range of hills to the Franklin Pike.

The men in Lee's corps, on the Confederate right, were taken completely by surprise by the collapse and rout of their left and center. They were flushed with the sense of victory, having just successfully repulsed Wood's vigorous assault on their position and, says Lee, were "in fine spirits and confident of success." Lee's corps, of course, was now forced to retreat also; but its

withdrawal was in more orderly fashion, making it possible to establish a rearguard along the pike. One of the men in the ranks has left an account of how Lee himself, by personal example, contributed to the prevention of panic in his command:

At the time of the break General Lee was sitting, mounted, in the rear of Clayton's division. Over on the left we could see confusion, and a Federal line advancing from the rear and attacking Johnson's division on the left wing of Lee's corps. Everything else had apparently been swept before it. Clayton's division was divided by the Franklin Pike. General Lee rode across the pike, taking both stone fences, followed by one of his staff and two of his escort. He rode until he reached the rear of Stevenson's division of his corps, and rode right into the midst of fugitives and in the face of the enemy who by this time had reached the rear of Pettus' brigade. General Lee seized a stand of colors from a color bearer and carried it on horseback, appealing to the men to rally. . . . The effect was electrical. Men gathered in little knots of four or five, and he soon had around him three or four other stands of colors. The Federals, meeting this resistance, hesitated and halted. (It was late in the evening and misty.) The rally enabled Clayton's division to form a nucleus and establish a line of battle on one of the Overton Hills to the rear, crossing the Franklin Pike in the woods near Colonel Overton's house. Here he was joined by a few pieces of artillery and a little drummer boy who beat the long roll in perfect time, as Gibson's brigade came up and formed a rear guard.

Lee's corps, in event of disaster, had been entrusted with the responsibility of holding the Franklin Pike until the retreating Confederates could use it as an avenue of escape, and this function was performed most capably. As soon as it became obvious that the day was irretrievably lost and that the Confederates' only hope was to save what they could out of the wreckage of defeat, Lee moved with alacrity and efficiency. Informed by Hood that the Federals were already near Brentwood on the Franklin Pike, Lee quickly abandoned the line he had formed across the pike near the Overton house and hastened everything to the rear. At 10 p.m. a new rearguard line was established at Hollow Tree Gap, beyond Brentwood and seven miles north of Franklin. Wood's pursuit was not particularly energetic, and he bivouacked several miles short of the gap when night fell.

THE LAST COMBAT ACTION of the battle was a spirited cavalry engagement on the Granny White Pike about dark. Chalmers, late in the afternoon, rallied his scattered troopers and moved across from the Hillsboro to the Granny White Pike. He formed a line in front of Brentwood to protect the wagons and ambulances collected there. About 4:30 p.m. he received Hood's frantic message to "Hold the Granny White Pike at all hazards," and the brigade was accordingly placed in position across that road, just north of the lane leading to Brentwood. A stout barricade of logs, brush, and fence rails was built.

In the unusual tactical situation now existing, Chalmers was in rear of Wilson, who was in rear of Cheatham's position. Following the collapse of the Confederate left, however, Wilson's victorious and elated troopers had remounted and now came plunging out the pike in pursuit of the fleeing Confederate infantry, through the gathering darkness and the downpour of freezing rain. Only temporarily disconcerted by the unexpected obstacle in their path, the blue-coated riders formed front into line and charged the barricade, thousands against hundreds. Although overwhelmingly outnumbered, the Confederates fought desperately, and what General Wilson later described as "one of the fiercest conflicts that ever took place in the Civil War" ensued.

The battle at the barricade and in the adjoining fields to which it overflowed finally degenerated into a veritable dogfight

THIS IS a section of Howard Pyle's famous "The Battle of Nashville" which hangs in the Minnesota State Capitol in St. Paul. It shows part of a Minnesota regiment attacking Shy's Hill on December 16, 1864.



of individual, hand-to-hand combat, during which Colonel Rucker was wounded, disarmed, and captured. Wilson writes:

It was a scene of pandemonium, in which flashing carbines, whistling bullets, bursting shells, and the imprecations of struggling men filled the air. . . . Every officer and man did his full duty in the headlong rush which finally drove Chalmers and his gallant horsemen from the field, in hopeless rout and confusion. They had stood their ground bravely, but were overborne at every turn and at every stand by the weight and fury of the Union onset.

Chalmers' last stand had been a desperate and costly one, but it had accomplished its purpose. What was left of his outfit withdrew unpursued to the Franklin Pike, and when the last of the retreating infantry and artillery had passed, the weary troopers camped on the pike with the rearguard for the night. Wilson, his men badly scattered and tired from a full day's fighting, gave orders just before midnight for each command to bivouac where orders overtook it, and to take up the pursuit the following morning.

THE NEXT 10 DAYS were a nightmare of nerve-wracking hardship and struggle for both armies. Alternately marching and fighting, worn down by battle fatigue and sheer physical exhaustion, they somehow managed to carry on an almost continuous running battle from Nashville to the Tennessee River. The weather was abominable—rain, sleet, and snow, with below-freezing temperatures. The wagons and guns quickly churned the roads into seemingly bottomless quagmires which froze into sharp-edged ruts during the cold nights. The heavy rains not only drenched the suffering soldiers but soon flooded the streams and made their passage a serious problem.

Hood's defeat-shocked army was on short rations—mostly parched corn, with an occasional feast of corn pone and fat bacon or perhaps a pilfered pig or pullet. A fortunate few had blankets or overcoats picked up on the battlefield, but most of them had only their threadbare uniforms to protect them from the icy rain that seemed to pierce to the very marrow of their bones. Many had no hats, but it was the scarcity of shoes that presented an especially acute problem. The number of men who were wholly or partially barefooted is almost unbelievable, and Hood's weary veterans left bloody footprints as they stumbled over the frozen ruts.

Thomas' men were well-shod, well-fed and well-clothed, but they had their share of difficulties. And a steady downpour of freezing rain, with muddy roads and swollen streams, will slow down the progress of the most excellently equipped army.

GENERAL FORREST and his men, marching overland from Murfreesboro and driving several hundred head of hogs and cattle, were a welcome addition to Hood's army in Columbia, across Duck River, on the 19th. Here the command of the rearguard was formally assigned to Forrest, and his performance in this capacity was a masterpiece of doing much with little, holding the pursuing Federals at arm's length day after day. On a cold Christmas morning the advance of Hood's weary infantry reached the Tennessee River at Bainbridge, Alabama, near Florence, where the army crossed the river on a pontoon bridge and began the long march to Tupelo, Mississippi, their designated destination. Forrest and the rearguard made a stand at Pulaski on Christmas Day, and on the 26th maneuvered their pursuers into an ambush which, Forrest reported, resulted in their "complete rout" and the capture of one Federal gun. His report concludes: "The enemy was pursued for two miles, but showing no disposition to give battle my troops were ordered back."

That was the last real effort by the Federals to impede the Confederate retreat. Forrest and the last of the rearguard crossed the Tennessee on December 27, and on the 29th Thomas issued general orders declaring the pursuit at an end.

Casualties in the Battle

BATTLE LOSSES AT NASHVILLE—Casualties at Nashville appear to be somewhat light in view of the size and duration of the collision. However, the Federal troops lost many dead saulting strong Confederate positions on Rains's Hill on December 15 and on Overton's Peach Orchard Hill on December 16 in diversionary attacks. Confederate reports of killed and wounded are missing, but they are generally believed to be light since they were protected by entrenched positions. The heaviest Confederate loss was in prisoners taken in the swift Federal advance and penetration which surrounded men who were attempting to hold positions to the last in the vicinity of Shy's Hill.

ESTIMATED LOSSES:

Confederate—Total Force23,000	Federal	...70,000
Engaged15,000		43,000
Casualties (K & W)	..Unknown		3,000
Captured4,000		100

HOOD'S OFFICIAL REPORT of the battle of Nashville, to General Beauregard, written at Tupelo on January 9, is a masterpiece of half-truths, imparting the news of a disaster in carefully sugarcoated terms. But, sugarcoat it as much as he chose, Hood in his heart knew the bitter truth. His invasion of Tennessee, the last flare-up of aggressive military action by the Southern Confederacy, had ended in disastrous failure. His vision of a victorious Confederate army advancing to the Ohio River was to remain a dream. The Confederate battle-flags would not be seen waving in Cincinnati or Chicago—a possibility Grant had pictured. The Battle of Nashville had decided that, and thereby decided the fate of the Confederate States of America.

It was at Nashville that Hood, wisely or not, had risked all on one cast of the military dice, and lost. For it was by the Battle of Nashville, as one of Thomas' biographers has so well said, that "One of the two great armies of the Confederacy was eliminated from the final problem, and with the total overthrow of that army, the very cause which it had so long and so gallantly sustained was lost."

As a Bugler Saw Nashville

Henry Campbell, a young bugler in the 18th Indiana Battery, wrote the following account of the second day of the Battle of Nashville in his diary:

DEC. 16—I got permission from the colonel to go out and see the battlefield Friday afternoon during the fight. About three miles out I reached the lines, both sides firing vigorously. The artillery made one continual roar. Just as I reached there the charge was made on the keypoint of the Rebel lines, a high, conical-pointed hill. Three or four of our batteries shelled it for awhile. At the signal, the lines advanced in one grand charge in the midst of a terrible storm of bullets and grape. Our brave men knew no faltering. On the brow of the hill as our men came over, the Rebels poured one awful rain of death, but with a wild long shout, our men sprang over the works and fought with their bayonets and butts of their guns.

All of the enemy along this front were captured. They were too close to run. As soon as the success of the charge was seen, our line toward the left began charging, one regiment at a time, in one great tidal wave of victory across the cornfields as far as I could see. The Rebels seemed to know everything was lost, as they threw away guns, blankets, and everything that would hinder their flight.