

A Portfolio


NASHVILLE


Then
&
Now



THE TENNESSEE STATE CAPITOL (above), designed by William Strickland, occupies a prominent hill in the center of Nashville. The Federals turned it into a veritable fortress which residents of the city mockingly called Fort Andrew Johnson. The cornerstone for this imposing building was laid on July 4, 1845.

BELOW IS a view taken from approximately the same position several months ago. ("Then" photographs are from the National Archives; "Now," are by Bill Witsell.)








On the opposite page are "Then and Now" photographs of a railroad bridge over the Cumberland River. In the lower or "then" view, the bridge is fortified and flooring has been installed for the passage of troops. Note the loopholes and sentry. In the modern view, a pile of building materials stands where the small boy and his steed were in the earlier picture.



ON THIS PAGE are "before and after" views looking northeast from the Tennessee State Capitol.



Cavalry

BOTH CONFEDERATE AND FEDERAL ARMIES had new cavalry commanders for the Nashville Campaign. For the Confederates, "that devil" Forrest was the new commander. Engaged in the destruction of Johnsonville when he learned of his assignment, he could not report until he had finished that operation. Reaching Florence, Alabama, on November 16 and 17, he reported about 5,000 men: three brigades of his own, plus Jackson's division, and part of Dibrell's brigade under Biffle who were already with Hood. Forrest formed his forces into three divisions: Jackson's, with Armstrong's and Ross's brigades; Chalmers', with Rucker's and Biffle's brigades; and Buford's, with Bell's and Crossland's brigades.

JAMES HARRISON WILSON was the new Federal commander. One of the war's "boy wonders," breveted major general five years after graduation from West Point, Wilson had served with the Army of the Potomac, then with the Army of the Shenandoah, and thence to command of the cavalry in the Military Division of the Mississippi under Sherman. When Hood turned north, Sherman retained Kilpatrick, with the 3d Cavalry Division, and sent Wilson to Nashville to complete the cavalry reorganization and assist Thomas against Hood.

Wilson reached Nashville on November 6, and took command of all of Thomas' cavalry. Those active in the campaign were: Croxton's 1st Brigade of McCook's 1st Division, Hatch's 5th Division, R. W. Johnson's 6th Division, and Knipe's 7th Division.

The latter did not complete its organization until December and was not engaged until the Battle of Nashville. By the end of the campaign Wilson's cavalry greatly exceeded Forrest's depleted forces, but on November 21, Thomas reported Wilson could raise only about 3,000 effective cavalry.

Wilson met Schofield on November 23 between Lynnville and Pulaski and took command of the forces in the field. He reported: "The 5th Division at this time contained but 2,500 men; Croxton's brigade about 1,000; and Capron's brigade (6th Division), 800; in all, about 4,300 men."

The use which Hood and Thomas made of their cavalry played a decisive role in the campaign. At first, Wilson did not consider his forces a match for Forrest, although on November 28, he wrote: "Our force is now getting to be very respectable, and if Forrest will only wait for us, we shall soon be able to cope with him."

WHEN Hood started into Tennessee on November 21, Schofield, with the IV and XXIII Corps, about 23,000 men, was in Pulaski, 75 miles from Nashville and 31 miles south of Columbia. Hood's first objective was to cut off and destroy this force before it could unite with Thomas. With the cavalry leading the way, he attempted to reach Columbia, where both the railroad and the turnpike crossed the Duck River, before Schofield. Chalmers' division, with Forrest and his escort, moved via West Point, Kelly's Forge, Henryville, and Mount Pleasant. Buford and Jackson moved through Lawrenceburg and Campbellsville, encountering Hatch at Lawrenceburg. Here, on the morning of the 22d a sharp all-day engagement took place.

Next day, Hatch fell back nine miles toward Pulaski, fighting another action until 8 p.m., when he broke off and joined the rest of the Federal command on the Campbellsville Road. That same day, Rucker's brigade encountered Capron's at Henryville, taking 45 prisoners. Capron fell back to Fouché's Springs and made another stand. Forrest and his escort got in the rear of Capron, and charged, "producing a perfect stampede." Rucker rested till 1 a.m. on the 24th, then moved to Mount Pleasant to capture 35,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

Hatch was attacked that same day by Jackson and Buford, and retired on the road to Lynnville. That morning Rucker pursued Capron to the edge of Columbia, just too late to seize the crossings of the Duck River before the arrival of Cox's division of the XXIII Corps, which had left Pulaski on the 22d. Most of the cavalry reached Columbia by evening, and Forrest invested the town until Hood's infantry arrived on the morning of the 27th.

HOOD'S FIRST ATTEMPT to cut off Schofield had failed. But there was still a chance if he could get across Schofield's

line of retreat at Spring Hill, 11 miles north on the road to Franklin. On the 28th, he sent Forrest across the fords of the Duck River to the east, and upstream from Columbia. Chalmers was ordered to cross at Carr's Mills, seven miles above Columbia; Jackson, at Holland's Ford; Buford, on the Lewisburg to Franklin Pike; while Forrest himself, with part of Biffle's brigade, crossed at Owen's Ford. Forrest's escort was sent to destroy the railroad at Shelbyville.

Capron's brigade, reinforced by the 5th Iowa and 7th Ohio, was on the Lewisburg Pike near Rally Hill. His brigade and Croxton's were formed into a temporary division under R. W. Johnson. Buford encountered such heavy opposition from them that he could not cross until late, and so advised Forrest about 11 p.m. Ross then encountered Capron and drove him back towards Hurt's Cross Roads, farther north on the pike. At the river several detachments of Federals under Major Morris Young, 5th Iowa, were cut off and rammed their way through Ross's brigade after dark. On the night of the 28th, Chalmers' division joined Forrest about eight miles from Columbia on the Spring Hill and Carr's Mill road. Meanwhile, Wilson had concentrated his force near Hurt's Cross Roads.

EARLY on the 29th, Forrest, with Chalmers, moved east to join Jackson and Buford in attacking Wilson, forcing him back toward Franklin. At Mount Carmel, at about 9 a.m., Hatch's division relieved Croxton's rearguard brigade and after a sharp engagement fell back and crossed the Harpeth River. Leaving Ross to follow the Federals, Forrest turned west toward Spring Hill, having completely deceived Wilson as to his intentions. At 4:10 p.m., four miles east of Franklin, Wilson advised Thomas: "The enemy has disappeared; I think moving, via Peytonville, toward Nashville . . . I shall be concentrated again in two or three hours so as to cover the Brentwood Pike, and be able to reach the Nolensville Pike by daylight, so that should Forrest succeed in reaching Nashville ahead of me, I shall be there very closely behind him."


INSTEAD, Forrest had been carrying out the true function of cavalry in effectively screening the way for Hood's infantry. He had driven off Wilson and prevented him from keeping Schofield informed of Confederate movements, and had kept Hood informed on Federal moves. Two miles east of Spring Hill he encountered pickets of the 2d Division of Stanley's IV Corps, which had left Columbia that morning. At 11:30 a.m., the 2d Division had been two miles from Spring Hill when word came that Buford's division was halfway between Rally Hill and Spring Hill. The division double-quickened into Spring Hill, deploying the leading brigade as it advanced, and drove off the Confederate cavalry which would soon have occupied the town. Forrest immediately attacked but was driven back. He had dismounted his men and resumed the attack when word came from Hood to hold his position at all hazards, as the advance of the infantry was only two miles distant. Bell's brigade, dismounted, attacked with only four rounds of ammunition per man, and drove the Federals from their rifle pits toward Spring Hill. Chalmers reported that the cavalry held the Federal infantry in check until about 4 p.m., when Cleburne's division arrived.

There followed the incredible confusion of orders which allowed the Federals to march through Spring Hill on the night of the 29th, and make good their escape to Franklin. Wherever the fault lay it was not with the cavalry. Ross, after following Wilson toward Franklin, had crossed over to Thompson Station, four miles north of Spring Hill, and had destroyed the railroad bridge and a train of ordnance, and captured a few prisoners. By this time Chalmers' and Buford's divisions

Operations

By Thomas A. Wigginton

Drawing by Frederic Ray.



were out of ammunition, and efforts to supply them from the infantry were unsuccessful, as the wagon trains had not come up. Armstrong's brigade had a little ammunition left, and that night did what it could to hinder the Federal movement between Spring Hill and Thompson Station, but lacking infantry support, could not halt the movement. About midnight, Ross again attacked at Thompson Station, "killed several Yankees and mules," and captured 39 wagons. As his brigade totaled only 686 men, Ross had to withdraw, and "remained on the hills overlooking the pike until daylight, and saw the Yankee Army in full retreat."

AT FRANKLIN, on the 30th. Forrest proposed that with

one division of infantry and his cavalry corps, he could flank the enemy out of their fortified positions by an attack around their right wing. Hood insisted on the frontal attack, and the cavalry was divided: Chalmers on the left flank of the infantry, and Forrest, with Jackson and Buford, on the right. Wilson's cavalry took position on the north bank of the Harpeth River, east of Franklin, to prevent Forrest from making the flanking movement which both he and Schofield expected. At 9:50 a.m. on the 30th Schofield wired Thomas: "I do not know where Forrest is; he may have gone east, but, no doubt, will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely unable to cope with him." Again, at 3 p.m. he wired: "I have no doubt Forrest

will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief."


In the Battle of Franklin, Buford's division was dismounted on the right of Stewart's corps, covering the ground from the Lewisburg pike to the Harpeth River. Jackson's division crossed the river, and attacked the Federals on the north side. Buford's division forced the troops in front of them across the river, and joined Jackson. Wilson, reinforced, considerably outnumbered Forrest's two divisions, and was able to hold them in check until nightfall, when they fell back across the Harpeth to replenish their ammunition. Wilson reported: "Hatch and Croxton made a beautiful fight."

On the morning of December 1, Forrest recrossed the Harpeth and advanced up the Wilson Pike to Owen's Cross Roads, where he had a brush with Hatch; then moved on to Brentwood where Chalmers joined him. Next day, he ordered Chalmers west to cover the Hillsboro and Harding Pikes, and took position with Buford's and Jackson's divisions near the asylum on the Murfreesboro Pike, within sight of the capitol building at Nashville.

When Hood sat down in front of Nashville to await an attack by Thomas, he made the mistake of dividing his cavalry, sending Chalmers to his left flank, to cover the long stretch between the infantry on the Hillsboro Pike across the Harding and Charlotte Pikes to the Cumberland River, and detaching Forrest, with the remainder of his command, along with infantry support, for an expedition against Murfreesboro, held by Rousseau with 8,000 men. Forrest, and most of his command, had no part in the Battle of Nashville, and did not rejoin Hood's main army until the battle had been lost.

THOMAS, on the other hand, bent every effort to support Wilson in his determination to build a unified, effective, cavalry force which was to operate as a unit. Despite constant prodding from his superiors, he refused to move against Hood until the cavalry was ready. On December 2, the Federal cavalry went into camp at Edgefield, now East Nashville, on the north bank of the Cumberland River. "Here, during the ensuing ten days, every effort was made to put it into efficient condition for active service. Horses were seized, arms, clothing, and equipment issued, and the dismounted men organized into brigades." So thor-

Drawing by Frederic T. Chapman from Fairfax Downey's "Famous Horses of the Civil War," Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1959.



Thomas A. Wigginton, a native of Mississippi, is a graduate of Vanderbilt University. He has assisted the Tennessee Civil War Centennial Commission in research projects.

oughly were the orders to seize horses carried out, that even those from Governor Andrew Johnson's own stables were taken. Johnson protested vigorously to Thomas, and is said to have called Wilson a "bumptious puppy," but Thomas upheld his cavalry commander. On the 12th, the corps crossed the Cumberland, and massed between the Harding and Charlotte Pikes, west of Nashville. "The effective force was 12,500 men, 9,000 horses, 2,000 of which were scarcely fit for service." The dismounted men were organized into foot brigades.

MEANWHILE, on December 3, Chalmers sent the 26th Tennessee Battalion (Forrest's old command)—300 men and two guns—to blockade the Cumberland River at Bell's Mills (just north of the present Clees's Ferry), 18 miles by river below Nashville. He captured two transports laden with Federal horses and mules. Although next day gunboats recaptured the empty transports, the Cumberland was closed to traffic until December 15. On December 6, Rucker's brigade, with two more guns, was stationed on the Charlotte Pike.

The day before, Forrest, with Buford and Jackson, had moved on Murfreesboro, leaving Nixon's regiment of Bell's brigade to picket between the Murfreesboro Pike and the river. Forrest was joined by the infantry at LaVergne, and on the 7th fought unsuccessfully with troops who had moved out from Murfreesboro under General Milroy. Forrest's supporting infantry broke and ran, and could not be rallied. Buford, in a flanking movement, charged into the heart of Murfreesboro but had to withdraw; Jackson charged the Federals and checked their advance, so that they withdrew into their fortifications. On the 11th, Buford was sent to the Hermitage (home of Andrew Jackson) to picket from the Lebanon Pike to the river; and Forrest, with Jackson, raided the rail communications around Murfreesboro until Hood sent him word of a general engagement and orders to be ready for prompt movement.

ON DECEMBER 12, Hood sent Biddle to the right wing, leaving Chalmers with only Rucker's brigade between the Hillsboro Pike and the Cumberland. On the 14th Ector's infantry brigade was sent to relieve Chalmers on the Harding Pike, but Chalmers still had only 900 men to cover the four miles from the pike to the river. Opposing him was the entire Federal cavalry corps, with Hatch on the Harding Pike; next, Croxton's brigade; then Johnson on the Charlotte Pike, with Knipe in reserve between the two roads.

As described in Thomas' Special Field Orders: "The object of the entire operations of the cavalry is to clear the enemy from its immediate front, cover the right of the infantry, envelop the enemy's left flank, and, if possible, reach the Franklin Pike somewhere in the vicinity of Brentwood. The greatest celerity of movement is therefore necessary." The territory over which the cavalry was to operate is now one of Nashville's finest residential sections. At that time it was all open country with few houses. Harding's Belle Meade estate covered over 5,000 acres, and most of the cavalry action on the first day was on that estate. Along the Hillsboro Pike, where the second day's action began, lay the Compton estate, mainly to the east of the pike, between Sugar Tree Creek and the present Tyne Boulevard. Much of it contained high, heavily wooded hills, so much unsuited for cavalry action that Wilson suggested that his corps be shifted to the Federal left flank on the second day.

THOMAS, under constant harassment to take the offensive, had made preparations for an attack on December 10, but on the 9th, freezing rain began, covering the ground with a sheet of ice, and making footing too treacherous for either horses or men to move. This lasted five days; on the 14th a thaw set in, and Thomas gave orders for the attack on the next morning.


On the 15th, the Federals attacked along the whole line. Ector's brigade was overwhelmed, and scurried over to the Hillsboro Pike without notice to Chalmers, whose headquarters and division ordnance trains had been left at the Harding home, now known as the Belle Meade Mansion. This left the road open, and Hatch captured the trains before Chalmers even knew they were unguarded. R. W. Johnson attacked on the Charlotte Pike, and was checked by Rucker until Chalmers learned the Federals were two miles in his rear. He sent the 7th Alabama across to the Hillsboro Pike, and that night camped with Rucker's brigade at a crossroads leading from the Harding to the Hillsboro Pike.

Before daylight on the 16th, he received orders to connect with Hood's left wing, and to hold the Hillsboro Pike. He took position on the pike where the Vaughan's Gap Road from Brentwood intersected, and was engaged by Hatch attempting to move along the crossroad to Brentwood to cut off the Confederate line of retreat. Chalmers, with his escort and Kelley's regiment, moved to the Granny White Pike and held it until Cheatham's ambulances had passed. Johnson had followed over from the Charlotte Pike and joined Hatch in the attack on the balance of Rucker's brigade. This brigade, except for the 7th Tennessee, which Hood had sent down the Hillsboro Pike to Franklin to guard the wagon trains, was forced back to a point in front of Brentwood to protect the wagons and ambulances collected there. At about 4:30 p.m. an order came from Hood to "hold the Granny White Pike at all hazards." Rucker's brigade moved back upon it, and was attacked by Hatch's and Johnson's divisions. By this time it was dark, and difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Here ensued a wild, hand-to-hand melee in which the 12th Tennessee, U.S.A., met the 12th Tennessee, C.S.A., and captured the division flag. Rucker was wounded and captured, subsequently having an arm amputated. The brigade camped for the night on the Franklin Pike as the rearguard, and was later joined there by Biffle.

ON THE NIGHT of the 16th, Forrest received news of the disaster and instructions to fall back via Shelbyville to Pulaski. He sent Buford via LaVergne to Franklin to join Chalmers in the rearguard; they were further strengthened by Armstrong at Spring Hill on the 18th. Forrest, with the rest of the command, reached Columbia on the same day. Here Forrest took command of the rearguard: his cavalry, plus infantry under E. C. Walthall. Walthall had consolidated the remnants of eight brigades into four, totaling about 1,900 men, 400 without shoes. Forrest placed these barefoot men on the wagons to save their feet from the frozen and rutted roads, and they would dismount and hobble into action when a stand was to be made. Forrest now had about 3,000 cavalry, all scantily clad and poorly armed.

HOOD STARTED south for the Tennessee River on December 20. That same day, Hatch crossed Rutherford Creek on a floating bridge and advanced to the Duck River, where high water again delayed him. On the 22d, Wilson threw pontoons across the river at Johnson's Landing above Columbia, and Forrest withdrew toward Pulaski, leaving Chalmers on the Bigbyville Pike, and Buford and Jackson protecting the infantry on the main pike. Chalmers reported no action until the 24th, when he was attacked near Lynnville by Hatch's division and Croxton's brigade, and forced back to a junction with Buford.

Forrest had sent the infantry from Lynnville about three miles toward Columbia, with cavalry on both flanks. He checked the Federals in a severe two-hour engagement; then withdrew to Richland Creek with Armstrong thrown forward in support of six guns on the main pike, Ross on his right flank, and Buford and Chalmers, after their junction, on his left flank. Two Federal guns were dismounted, but while Hatch pressed the main pike, Croxton got across the creek on the flanks, and Jackson's division was withdrawn across the bridge to meet him. Buford and Chalmers were heavily engaged; Buford was wounded, and Chalmers took command of both divisions. After two hours fighting they, too, were withdrawn, and Forrest fell back to Pulaski.



From Pulaski, Chalmers moved on the right flank of the infantry until he crossed the Tennessee at Bainbridge, Alabama, on the evening of the 27th, without being again engaged. On the morning of the 25th, Forrest left Jackson in Pulaski to check the Federals, led by Harrison's brigade of the 6th Division while, with the rest of his force, he took position at King's Hill (also called Anthony's Hill), seven miles south of Pulaski, at the head of a deep, heavily wooded ravine. Here Forrest prepared an ambush, with only a thin skirmish line of infantry exposed. At about 2 p.m., Jackson's division appeared, closely followed by Harrison's brigade. The Federals dismounted and charged the skirmish line, to be met on front and flanks by a withering fire of artillery and small arms that sent them staggering back in disorderly retreat. The infantry pursued and captured a number of prisoners and one piece of artillery. Hatch, Croxton, and Hammond (of the 7th Division), then moved on the flanks, and Forrest withdrew to Sugar Creek for the night.

HERE, on the morning of the 26th, a last attack was made by Hammond's brigade. Dense fog concealed the temporary fortifications thrown up by the Gray infantry, and the Federals advanced to within 50 feet, when a volley was poured in upon them, causing "the wildest confusion." Ross's brigade charged with the infantry and pursued the routed bluecoats for nearly a mile. The Federals made no further attack between Sugar Creek and the Tennessee River, which Forrest crossed at Bainbridge on the evening of the 27th.

Forrest's report of the campaign stated:

From the day I left Florence on the 21st of November to the 27th of December my cavalry were engaged every day with the enemy. My loss in killed and wounded has been heavy. I brought out of the campaign three pieces of artillery more than I started with. My command captured and destroyed 16 blockhouses and stockades, 20 bridges, several hundred horses and mules, 20 yoke of oxen, 4 locomotives, and 100 cars and 10 miles of railroad, while I have turned over to the provost-marshal-general about 1600 prisoners.

General Thomas' report said: "With the exception of his [Hood's] rearguard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefoot men. . . . The rearguard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the end." This tribute from the enemy to the valor and effectiveness of Forrest's cavalry was fully justified.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, General Wilson, too, must be given full credit for a job well done. Arriving as a stranger, he welded a scattered and disorganized cavalry corps into an effective fighting force which played a decisive role in the Battle of Nashville. In commenting on the campaign, Wilson wrote: "If the operations just described have been of any avail in the recent campaign, it is due entirely to the concentration of the cavalry, and its reorganization as a separate corps." General Grant, in sending Wilson to Sherman, had said: "I believe Wilson will add 50 percent to the effectiveness of your cavalry." This, if anything, was an understatement.

... To Rescue the Confederacy: Hood Moves North

Continued from Page 15

WHILE COX was beating off attacks by Forrest, Schofield established an interior defensive line. This crossed the Mt. Pleasant Pike near the intersection of that pike with the present city street system (it was then the Hampshire Pike), and bent generally parallel to the initial defensive line. This line encompassed the then residential area of Columbia. There was only open farmland in the valley of Bigby Creek and to the south. During that day and the 25th, the new interior line was completely occupied, although Cox's division retained its original advanced position across the Mt. Pleasant Pike. There was violent artillery action by the Confederates and considerable skirmishing, during which some Federal units fell back short distances; but General T. J. Wood, whose 3d Division, IV Corps had been placed to cover the entire IV Corps sector as other units withdrew to the interior line, noted that by 2 p.m. on the 25th the Confederates had deployed only a single infantry division, doing most of the skirmishing with dismounted cavalry, a clear indication that Hood was merely demonstrating, with the intention of crossing Duck River elsewhere, or of sideslipping toward the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, about 50 miles to the east.

On the morning of the 26th, Schofield received Thomas' orders to hold the north bank of Duck River, keeping Hood south of the river until the Union forces could be concentrated to take the offensive, the orders indicating that A. J. Smith's force was arriving or about to arrive at Nashville. It had been raining all day, but Schofield now had a pontoon bridge across the river. That afternoon, he ordered the bulk of his trains to the north bank, using this and the railroad bridge, and prepared to move infantry and artillery over after dark. However, the all-day rain had rendered the approaches to the two bridges practically impassable, so the crossing was postponed.

BY EVENING of the 26th, leading infantry elements of the Army of Tennessee had deployed in front of Columbia, taking over from the cavalry. These were from Lee's corps. The next day they completed their deployment, with the right lapping over the Mt. Pleasant Pike. Cheatham's corps camped between the Mt. Pleasant and Pulaski Pikes, but near army headquarters, which was at Ashwood Hall, the residence of Colonel Andrew Polk. This stood a few hundred yards north of and across the Pulaski Pike from St. John's Church, at the intersection of the road to Ashwood.

Major General Patrick Ronayne Cleburne, the Irish-born commander of one of Cheatham's divisions, noted the beauty of the little church in its quiet grove. "If I should happen to die in battle," he said to his aide, "I should like nothing better than to be buried there." He was, after Franklin, along with Granbury and Strahl.

Stewart's corps was camped along the pike with its rear elements about two miles north of Mt. Pleasant.

Hood had lost the race to Columbia. He was disappointed but, he said later, he had a chance to use one of the maneuvers favored by Stonewall Jackson. He moved quickly, for he noted that Schofield had pulled his troops out of Columbia, across the river, following his trains, which were then moving north toward Franklin. He conferred with Forrest, who was familiar with the country between Columbia and Brentwood. Forrest needed little direction. Laying his plans carefully, on Monday morning, November 28 he moved his divisions across the river and to the east.

HOOD ASSIGNED all the artillery with his army except two batteries to Lee's corps, which kept up pressure against the Federal positions south of Columbia. To anticipate: later, as Schofield withdrew from the town, Lee moved in behind him, halting only when he came to the bridges which Schofield had destroyed. Cheatham posted his division on Lee's right, his right

resting on Duck River and his left on the Pulaski Pike. Stewart brought his corps into echelon behind Cheatham and Lee, his right on the Pulaski Pike.

On the 28th, none of Schofield's troops had yet left Columbia, except part of Wagner's division, detailed as train guard. The trains had moved north and the head of the wagon column was now approaching Rutherford Creek, about six miles from Columbia. Thomas had counted prematurely on A. J. Smith's arrival and he wired Schofield, the evening of the 28th, to be prepared to defend the line of the Harpeth River at Franklin, rather than try to hold Hood beyond the Duck.

On the morning of the 29th, Schofield advised Thomas that Confederate cavalry had crossed in force on the Columbia-Lewisburg Pike, and that their infantry was crossing above Huey's Mill, four miles from Columbia. He promptly got under way for Franklin. He sent Stanley with two divisions of his IV Corps to Spring Hill, initially to protect the trains, later to hold the place until the rest of the Army of the Ohio could pass north. He issued detailed orders to each corps for the passage, going into meticulous detail on provisions for the passage of the Rutherford Creek bridge and Spring Hill. Cox's division was to be the last to leave Columbia; his pickets were to be withdrawn at midnight the 29th.

THE IMPETUS for this action came mainly from a dispatch from Wilson, at Hurt's Cross Roads, dated 3 a.m., bearing the outside address, "Major General Schofield by Courier from Spring Hill. Important! Trot!" In this, Wilson advised that all of Forrest's corps had crossed Duck River above Huey's Mill, Forrest himself leaving Columbia at 4:30 p.m. the 28th. Included in the message was the caution, "Get back to Franklin without delay"; a subsequent message from Wilson to Thomas advised that Forrest appeared to be heading for Nashville, and that he, Wilson, would retire toward Nolensville. However, by 10 p.m., after being driven rapidly north through Hurt's Cross Roads and Mt. Carmel, Wilson, with Hatch's division plus Hammond's brigade, was on the Franklin-Triune Road (present State 96) about 2½ miles east of Franklin. He was by this time out of communication with Schofield, but was in touch with Nashville, and had advised Thomas that the Confederates, using three pontoon bridges, had crossed the Duck River, driven Capron and Garrard away from Rally Hill, and were apparently heading for Franklin.

Hood had crossed most of his infantry at Davis' Ford around daylight of the 29th, sideslipping his two corps from Columbia along the same road by which Cox had moved from the Pulaski Pike to the Mt. Pleasant Pike, thence by country roads to the river. Cheatham's corps led the march from Duck River, with Stewart's following and Edward ("Allegheny") Johnson's division from Lee's corps bringing up the rear. As they marched along country roads toward the Rally Hill Pike, they could hear Lee's bombardment of Columbia. Forrest, having pushed Wilson out of the action by 10 a.m., had turned west, toward Spring Hill. Seizing this place, Hood would have Schofield in a vise between his own force and Lee's corps, following from Columbia.

THE NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN—Schofield, aware that Hood was about to move against him, left Pulaski on November 22, 1864 en route to join Thomas at Nashville. Hatch's cavalry division plus Capron's and Croxton's brigades screened his left flank. On the 21st, as soon as Forrest's cavalry joined him, Hood hastened toward Columbia to cut off Schofield. Forrest's cavalry engaged the Federal mounted units indecisively at the points indicated on the map. Failing to intercept Schofield at Columbia, Hood swung out to the right and again attempted to cut off Schofield at Spring Hill, while Forrest neatly took Wilson's cavalry out of the picture farther to the east. Hood failed again at Spring Hill and followed the Federals to Franklin. They made a brief stand and inflicted a costly defeat on Hood at Franklin, then continued on into the defenses of Nashville. (Map by Col. W. S. Nye.)



REINFORCEMENTS FOR THOMAS—Miller's "Photographic History of the Civil War" identifies this as a Federal battery at Johnsonville, Tenn. the day before they broke camp and hurried to Nashville to augment Thomas' force there. (National Archives.)

READY TO FOLLOW HOOD—Stevenson, in the northeastern corner of Alabama, was a marshalling point for the transfer of Federal troops from Atlanta to Nashville. This photograph from "Miller's Photographic History" shows Federals awaiting transportation shortly before Hood began his move north.



But as Forrest approached Spring Hill along the road from Duplex and Mt. Carmel, he ran into infantry pickets of the Federal IV Corps. Stanley, taking Wagner's and Kimball's divisions, had moved north rapidly. He had left Kimball at Rutherford Creek to cover that crossing. En route to Spring Hill with Wagner's people, he learned of the approach of Forrest and moved his infantry at the double into the tiny village. He put them in a hastily prepared position enclosing the village on three sides. Within the enclosure thus formed Stanley completed the parking of Schofield's enormous wagon train in a 50-acre open field south of the road between Spring Hill and the railroad station, and just east of the railroad.

ALONG its northeastern extent, Wagner's position, held by the brigade of Colonel Emerson Opdycke, with Colonel John Q. Lane's Brigade on his right, and to the south of the Duplex (or Mt. Carmel) Road, overlooked one of the junctions of the Rally Hill Pike with the Franklin Pike. In its southeastern sector, skirmishers from Bradley's brigade covered the Rally Hill Pike, along which the Army of Tennessee was approaching Spring Hill. It was these skirmishers whom Forrest first encountered about 11:30 a.m. While pushing them back toward Spring Hill, Forrest received a message to hold his position at all hazards, until Hood could bring his infantry into the action. This Forrest did, although it was midafternoon before Cleburne's division came up on the left of the dismounted cavalrymen. These, being nearly out of ammunition, were pulled out of the line and moved north, to cover further the advance of the army, or to deter the Federal advance.

HOOD at this time was at the crossing of Rutherford Creek. Having dispatched Cleburne, he took Bate's division, next in column, which was moving along the Rally Hill Pike a short distance north of the Absalom Thompson house (where Hood had established his command post), and personally directed its commander to deploy and move west to the Franklin Pike. On reaching that pike, *he was to sweep toward Columbia.* With

these orders, Hood countermanded orders which Cheatham, his corps commander, had already given Bate; these were to form and move on Cleburne's left, against the enemy near Spring Hill. Bate apparently said nothing about receipt of Cheatham's orders to Hood, nor did Hood tell Cheatham that he had been giving orders to one of his divisions. Although there is not always time for the niceties of command when an action impends, this silence by all concerned was inexcusable.

Bate advanced nearly 3,000 yards in line of battle before reaching the pike. On arriving, his leading element—Caswell's battalion of sharpshooters—promptly fired on a Federal column approaching from their left, a little south of the Cheairs house, which faces the highway from the east. At about the same time, a staff officer from Cheatham caught up with Bate and directed him to halt and move to join his right with Cleburne's left. It was now almost dark, and Granbury, with Cleburne's left brigade, was about 500 yards north along the pike. Procuring a guide, Bate made the contact. He also reported his contact with the Federal force to his left front, but Cheatham seems not to have been impressed. As a matter of fact, these people were from Ruger's division, and the leading element of Schofield's main body, advancing north from Columbia.

Following Bate's division was that of John C. Brown. By 4 p.m., it had cleared the crossing of Rutherford Creek. Cheatham moved it forward along the Rally Hill Pike, with orders to deploy on the right of Cleburne's division in the area vacated by Forrest's dismounted cavalrymen.

Cleburne, by 4:30 p.m., had fought a sharp little engagement in the southeastern outskirts of Spring Hill, in which he had pushed the Federal brigades of Bradley and Lane back into the village; he had sustained some casualties, one of which was his bay horse, Red Pepper, scored in the hip by a shell fragment, and thus deprived of the privilege of dying under his master at Franklin the next day. Just before sunset, the leading elements of Brown's division commenced arriving to take position on Cleburne's right.

ABOUT THIS TIME Stewart's corps, which had been following Cheatham's at a short distance, came into the picture. It had been held for a time south of Rutherford Creek to meet some fancied threat from the south, but was now marching north along the Rally Hill Pike, to pass behind the battle positions of Bate, Cleburne, and Brown, having left Edward Johnson's division south of the creek under orders from Hood. While his corps was marching north, Stewart had met Hood, who was

then "about a half mile north of Rutherford Creek and about the same distance west of the Rally Hill Pike"; this would place him about 300 yards west of the Thompson house, Hood's command post. Hood gave him a guide, a young man from the neighborhood, and directed him to move ahead and place his right across the pike beyond Spring Hill, his left to extend "down this way." This might have put his line behind Cheatham's to some extent, but it would not have been masked at the place where it mattered. As they moved north, his guide told Stewart that, at a certain point, the road made a sudden turn to the left, that is, toward Spring Hill, and that at this point there was a little-used road which continued north, meeting the Franklin Pike "at the tollgate some mile and a half beyond Spring Hill." This was the junction which lay in front of but outside the Federal defensive line by about 400 yards. They reached the fork of the road; here they found a road, apparently little used, passing through a large gateway. Mistaking this for the right-hand road, they moved up it a short distance until they ran into the Caldwell house, Forrest's command post. While they talked with Forrest, a staff officer from Cheatham's corps rode up and halted the column. He told Stewart that he had just come from Hood with orders that Stewart was to go into position on the right of Brown's division, and that the officer would act as guide. The head of Stewart's column then retraced its route and took the road to the left, leading into Spring Hill. Arrived at General Brown's command post, and being oriented as to his new orders, Stewart was still unsatisfied and rode back to Hood's command post, two miles south of the town. There he asked Hood if he had really sent the officer from Cheatham's staff to place his corps in position; he had, Hood said. Had he changed his mind as to what he wanted Stewart to do? He had not. Stewart then explained that, uncertain by reason of the change of orders, he had put his people in bivouac, since they had been on the move since daylight and it was now 11 p.m. For answer, according to Stewart's report, "Hood remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest, and directed me to move in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin."


BUT IN THE MORNING Schofield was gone. In the darkness between midnight and dawn he had moved his army out on the road to Franklin past the jaws of Hood's trap, imperfectly set with the withdrawal of Stewart's corps from the position where it could have blocked the retreat. Creaking wagons and marching men passed unchallenged the campfires of Con-

SPRING HILL—On the afternoon of November 29, 1864 the head of Forrest's cavalry, approaching Spring Hill via the Mt. Carmel Road, ran into infantry pickets covering the village to the east and south. These Federals were from Wagner's division, that Stanley, commanding the IV Corps, had hustled north from Columbia to seize and hold this critical crossroads against envelopment until Schofield's main force had passed. Stanley formed a hasty peripheral defense as shown, meanwhile parking within it Schofield's long wagon train and artillery as they arrived.

Hood, intending to intercept Schofield at Spring Hill, had swung out to the right with his whole force, less Lee's corps, and the heads of his infantry columns approached the area in the late afternoon as his cavalry was feeling out the enemy outpost line. Bate's division approached the pike and deployed, and the rest of Cheatham's corps formed on his right. But, curiously, Hood let Cheatham's men—and Stewart's, the head of whose column may be seen in the lower right approaching Rutherford Creek—sleep on their arms while Schofield's whole force marched along the pike under their very noses, and escaped toward Franklin.

This map has been adapted by Col. W. S. Nye from a modern topographic map on which have been superimposed country roads, fords, and other

The Affair at Spring Hill



terrain features that existed in 1864. This information was supplied by Mr. Allen Sloan, who lives in the old Thompson house that Hood used as a headquarters on the night of Nov. 29, 1864; Mr. Sloan has made a detailed study of the ground to determine the course of the old roads, many of which are erroneously plotted on the old maps. Troop dispositions are by Col. Campbell Brown.

federates sleeping within a few hundred yards of the road. Only as the column neared Thompson Station was there brief cavalry harassment by some of Forrest's men stationed there. The wagon train and most of the IV Corps moved first, then the XXIII Corps, and finally, near dawn, Wagner's division fell in as rearguard. It was a clean escape from what should have been a foolproof trap.

There had been a straggling Confederate private who, lost from his unit, reported to Hood that he had been on the Columbia Pike; that it had been full of Yankees, moving in both directions, and that somebody ought to do something about it. Hood awakened Pen Mason, his adjutant general, and directed him to order Cheatham to get somebody across the pike to stop that northward movement, then went back to sleep. So, apparently, did Mason, for Cheatham never received the order, although at one time he said that he had. But this last incident was all of a piece with the fumbling, indecision, and misunderstanding which beset the Army of Tennessee.

WHO WAS responsible? Not Cheatham, although Hood tried to pin the blame on him, but recanted. However, Cheatham might have been a little more aggressive and intelligent in gathering information in his front. Not Cleburne, on whom Hood, after that general had died on the field of Franklin, laid half-hearted hints of accusation. Not Bate, who tried to carry out conflicting orders from two commanders. Not Brown, who did as he was told. Certainly not Stewart, who in his perplexity finally got from Hood the decision which left the Franklin Pike wide open for Schofield. Not Forrest, nor any of his cavalymen, who did all they could to keep the initiative.

The culprit can have been none other than the army commander. In his final report, and in his book, *Advance and Retreat*, Hood comes up with a self-glorifying story that is so shot full of inaccuracies that it should not be considered in an analysis of the action. He, the commanding general, was officially responsible. If the operation had succeeded, his would have been the credit.

HOW DOES ONE explain the series of foggy decisions and conflicting orders which characterized Hood's conduct? The people around Spring Hill, and some well-educated students of the present generation say simply, "Hood was drunk." Stories of a bibulous celebration at the Thompson house, over the prospect of gobbling up Schofield in the morning, have been invented and embellished. There is no foundation for them.

But there is a theory propounded by a professional gentleman with military experience, who spent the greater part of his life in Spring Hill. He had both the education, experience, and imagination to offer an hypothesis worthy of consideration.

Hood was a man in constant pain. The stump of his leg had hardly healed from Chickamauga. In his useless arm he had what the doctors now call "central pain." He had had at least one fall with his horse during the march from Columbia that day. It is entirely conceivable that his staff doctor may have given him a small vial of brownish liquid, with an explanation something like this, "General, here's some laudanum. Too much of it'll put you to sleep, but if the pain gets too bad, just take a couple of small swallows. It'll help you."

Laudanum, derived from opium, produces within the consumer a state of euphoria, a certainty that everything is going to turn out right, that the user has the key to all problems, and has only to push a button, or turn a crank, or give an order, and the world's confusion and despair will vanish in a rosy cloud. It is not impossible that this is what happened to poor Hood, pain-racked and irritable. It can explain, also, the senseless waste of his army at Franklin next day.

THERE is another theory, propounded by an old Negro preacher who had been one of the Thompson servants around the very house where Hood had spent the night of November 29. (Incidentally, he pooh-poohed the idea that Hood and his staff had been drunk that night.) This writer's father had occasion to ask him once for his theory on the collapse of the Confederate hopes at Spring Hill. "I'll tell y'u, Mist' Lucius," he said, earnestly, "God just didn't want 'at war to go on no longer."

The Human Side of the

TWO COLONELS—The highest ranking officers to lose their lives at the Battle of Nashville were Colonels Sylvester G. Hill, commanding the 3d Brigade, A. J. Smith's Federal corps and Colonel William M. Shy of the 20th Tennessee Infantry, C.S.A.

The death of Colonel Hill occurred on December 15, 1864 just after he had ordered his brigade to charge Confederate Redoubt No. 2 on a hill between the present Woodmont Boulevard and Graybar Lane and east of the Hillsboro Pike. McArthur's 1st Division, of which Hill's brigade was a part, had just captured Redoubt No. 3, located on the property now occupied by the Calvary Methodist Church. Colonel Hill had formerly commanded the 35th Iowa Infantry.

As portions of Bate's Confederate division were being almost annihilated on a hill salient one quarter mile west of the Granny White Pike on the right of Cheatham's corps in the late afternoon of December 16, Colonel Shy, in personal command of the remnants of his regiment (in which he had enlisted as a private at the beginning of the war), was fighting alongside his men. Armed with an Enfield rifle, and desperately defending his position, he was shot between the eyes at close range and instantly killed. He had been ordered to hold this salient of the battle line at all costs. He and his embattled heroes, while being fired upon from three sides, took a staggering toll of the Blue attackers. Federal soldiers engaged in the assault named the hill where he died for Colonel Shy. This, the most hallowed spot on the Nashville battlefield, is a fitting memorial to the gallant officer who inspired his men to give their all for their cause.

OTHER HEROES—The outstanding hero on the Federal side at Nashville was without doubt Colonel Philip Sidney Post, commanding a brigade of General Beatty's division. On the first day of the battle Post's brigade was stationed at the foot of Montgomery Hill (on the present Cedar Lane), which was occupied by an advanced Confederate line. Colonel Post rapidly led his men over the parapets and took his position.

On the second day of battle, Post's brigade was in position before Peach Orchard Hill, a part of the John Overton estate east of the Franklin Pike. About 3 p.m., Post's and Thompson's brigades were ordered to assault the Confederate stronghold. Post led his lines with precision up the slope against a tremendous hail of shot and shell. Skirmishers reached the parapet and the main line came within 20 steps of the works when a concentrated fire from the Confederates halted the charge. Colonel Post was shot. At the time he was thought to be mortally wounded. The line retreated to the foot of the hill. Post was immediately made a brevet brigadier general, U.S.V. He recovered from his wounds and later served in the U.S. Consular Service, and in 1886 was elected to Congress.

One of the saddest and strangest cases in the Army of Tennessee was that of Thomas Benton Smith, a native of Williamson County, Tennessee. On the second day of the Battle of Nashville, Brigadier General Smith, then only 25 years of age, commanded Tyler's Brigade near the angle on what is now known as Shy's Hill. At the time of the Federal breakthrough, Smith doggedly held his position although many, including Colonel Shy, had been killed. Finally, realizing that further resistance was useless, he gave the command to cease fire and waved his handkerchief in surrender. He was disarmed, placed under guard, and moved about 700 yards to the Union rear. At this time he was confronted by a Federal officer whose positive identity has never been determined. This officer, probably angered by the desperate Confederate defense, struck the unarmed prisoner three times with his saber, casting him to the ground with an open skull fracture. Smith was hospitalized at the state prison with little hope for recovery. He did recover, however, and was confined at Fort Warren, Boston Harbor. At the end of the war he was released and returned to Nashville but his mind was permanently affected by the injury. General Smith spent most of his remaining years in the Central State Hospital

Nashville Campaign

By Paul H. Beasley

BELOW IS Maxwell House Hotel which was begun by John Overton in 1859 but was uncompleted when the Federals first occupied the city in 1862. Even so, it was used successively by them as a barracks, a hospital, and finally, a prison. In September 1863, a number of Confederate prisoners were killed and injured when a stairway collapsed in this building. The building was later completed and remained in use until destroyed by fire in 1961.



From Lanier Merritt collection

near Nashville. He was permitted from time to time to attend the reunions of his old regiment, the 20th Tennessee. It is said that on these occasions he could call the roll of the regiment from memory. General Smith died in 1923, one of the last surviving general officers of the Confederacy. He was buried in the Confederate Circle at Mount Olivet Cemetery in Nashville, after being honored with a state funeral. A simple stone placed in 1954 marks his resting place. In 1955 a street was named in his honor. Appropriately, it is located on Shy's Hill.

HEROINES TOO!—As the outnumbered Confederate cavalry retreated across the lawn of Belle Meade mansion on December 15, 1864, Miss Selene Harding, daughter of the owner, William Giles Harding, stood on the stone arm of the front steps waving her handkerchief through a hail of bullets, the marks of which may still be seen on the porch columns, until the men in gray disappeared behind the barn. Following the war, Miss Harding married General W. H. Jackson, who had commanded a brigade in Forrest's cavalry.

On the afternoon of December 15, 1864, when the badly beaten soldiers of Stewart's corps were retreating out the Granny White Pike, Miss Mary Bradford rushed from her home, east of the pike and south of the present Glendale Lane, and implored the men to reform their lines and face the enemy. Her appeal had no effect on the tired, discouraged men. However, her courage and patriotism in the face of danger won for Miss Bradford the praise of General Hood in his book *Advance and Retreat*.

A FUTURE PRESIDENT—Colonel Benjamin Harrison, formerly of the 70th Indiana Infantry Regiment, commanded the 1st Brigade of General Cruft's Provisional Division at the Battle of Nashville. Colonel Harrison's brigade occupied that part of the Federal defense line astride the Granny White Pike near the present Caldwell and Bate Avenues, after Thomas' main army had swept to the offensive on the morning of December 15, 1864. Colonel Harrison was later elected 23d President of the United States.

ALMOST HOME—During the decisive encounter on Shy's Hill, December 16, 1864, Lieutenant Thomas C. Shaw, Company C, 2d Tennessee Regiment (Cumberland Rifles), C.S.A., continued the fight after many had fled. He was pinned to the earth with a bayonet through the body. Lieutenant Shaw died soon afterward in a Nashville hospital to which he had been carried instead of to his father's nearby house after he had refused to take the oath of allegiance.

HER PROUDEST MOMENT—For two weeks prior to the Battle of Nashville, General John B. Hood had his headquarters at Traveler's Rest, the home of John Overton. During this period, according to family tradition, seven Confederate generals were entertained at dinner in the great dining room. They were Generals J. B. Hood, N. B. Forrest, B. F. Cheatham, W. H. Jackson, S. D. Lee, J. R. Chalmers, and E. W. Pettus. This occasion according to Mrs. Overton was the "proudest moment" of her life.

CAPTAIN BEAUREGARD'S HOWITZERS—Captain R. T. Beauregard, son of Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanded a battalion of artillery attached to Bate's division of Cheatham's corps at the Battle of Nashville.

General Bate tells in his report in the *Official Records* of discovering at daylight a farm road skirting the eastern side of Shy's Hill, over which artillery could be hauled. He ordered Captain Beauregard to bring a section of howitzers and place them on a small plateau just in the rear of Finley's Florida Brigade. From this position the right of Bate's division and the front of Walthall's division could be protected by fire. A portion of Beauregard's gun position may be observed today on the western side of the present Benton Smith Road just south of the steps on the trail that leads to the summit of Shy's Hill. The position was partially destroyed when Benton Smith Road was being graded. Close observation will also reveal traces of the road over which Beauregard moved his guns.

AN ARTICULATE PRIVATE—Private Sam R. Watkins, a member of Company H (The Maury Grays), 1st Tennessee Infantry Regiment, C. S. A., marched and fought with General

Stonewall Jackson in the western Virginia mountains. He also fought at Shiloh, Corinth, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, Dalton, Resaca, Adairsville, Kennesaw Mountain (Dead Angle), New Hope Church, Dallas, Zion Church, Cassville, Atlanta, Jonesboro, Franklin, Nashville, and Bentonville and was with General J. E. Johnston when the army was surrendered at Greensboro, North Carolina.

At Nashville, Watkins was in Cheatham's corps, Brown's division, Maney's Brigade, under the command of Colonel Hume R. Feild. When the corps was transferred from the right on the late afternoon on December 15, Watkins' brigade was placed on the extreme Confederate left as skirmishers on a steep hill. Here, on December 16, the Federals hidden in the dense undergrowth surprised the thin Confederate line and killed two of Watkins' close friends. Watkins relates that he killed the soldier who had killed one of his friends and then broke and ran through a concentrated fire of minie balls, bringing off one Federal prisoner in the process. He survived this skirmish with bullet wounds in hand and thigh and with eight bullet holes in his coat. This affair took place in the vicinity of Granny White Pike and the present Tyne Boulevard.

Despite Sam Watkins' excellent military record as a soldier, he is remembered most for his rare ability to depict the hardships of war from the viewpoint of the lowly private, in his book *Co. Aytch*.

CROSSED SABRES—The last sword crossing in combat in the Civil War in Davidson County occurred just inside the county line on Granny White Pike in numbing cold weather and total darkness on December 16. Hood's Army of Tennessee had been driven from the field around Nashville by Thomas' overwhelming forces just before nightfall. A barricade across the Granny White Pike, hastily erected by a detachment of Confederate cavalry under Colonel E. W. Rucker, was assailed by a pursuing Federal force under Colonel George Spalding of Wilson's cavalry. The fray was spectacular and fierce. Firing and hand-to-hand fighting was guided only by gun flashes along the pike and in the nearby fields. During the action, the two officers in command fought a duel on horseback in which each wrested the other's sword from the grasp of its owner and used it against his adversary. The duel ended when Colonel Rucker was shot through the arm by a nearby trooper and made prisoner.


The Federal cavalry pursuit was checked for the night by Colonel Rucker's defensive action and officers of both armies gave him high praise for saving the Army of Tennessee from possible capture the next morning. Colonel Spalding kept Rucker's sword as a memento of the duel but in a chivalric gesture 25 years later returned it to its owner.

STATES REPRESENTED—Twenty-two states of the 34 at that time had military units in the Battle of Nashville. Two states, Tennessee and Missouri, had units on both sides.

The following states were represented in the Federal forces: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

The Confederate Army of Tennessee included units from: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.

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
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
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
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



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